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Abstract
Some risky activities are optional, for example motoring. Participation in them
is most attractive for good risks, creating a tendency for advantageous selection in
the associated insurance market. Taxing insurance consequently yields e¢ ciency
gains when type is hidden. Results are strengthened if optimism is present. Finally,
endogenising participation implies that the standard "positive correlation" test for
the presence of policy relevant asymmetric information may fail.
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1 Introduction
Insurance mitigates individual risk. So does opting out of risky activities. Examples
of such avoidable pursuits are motoring, pet ownership, growing risky crops, traveling,
owning fragile high-value items and entering risky occupations. Existing hidden-types
models of insurance, most notably Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976), henceforth RS; have
ignored the possibility of avoidance. This paper shows that the opportunity to opt out
of risky activities has signicant implications for public policy. The reason is that bad
risks have least to gain from participation in the risky activity, introducing an element of
advantageous selection into the insurance market. Under these circumstances, a general
insurance tax has e¢ ciency benets. It curbs the entry of bad risks, whose presence
imposes a negative externality on good risks. An insurance tax may even yield Pareto
gains, though the main point of the paper is that the marginal cost of raising public funds
through general insurance taxation is below unity. A dollar raised through insurance
taxation improves the net of tax terms o¤ered to the insured so costs them less than a
dollar. This e¢ ciency e¤ect implies that even regressive taxation may raise welfare. If the
tax proceeds are used to fund a public good, there may be gains even if the willingness
to pay of the beneciaries is below the cost of provision and the beneciaries are better
o¤ than the payers.
The theoretical literature on insurance market intervention mostly builds on the insight
of RS (pp. 643-645) that, in a separating equilibrium, cross subsidization of policies may
generate a Pareto improvement. A number of papers have devised schemes to implement
this possibility. One way is to require a small amount of mandatory cover as Wilson (1977)
and Dahlby (1981) show. Crocker and Snow (1985) demonstrate that Pareto e¢ cient
redistribution can sometimes be e¤ected through a tax on incomplete cover contracts
and a subsidy to full cover policies. A system of tradeable permits to sell low cover
policies similarly implements this outcome, as analyzed by Bisin and Gottardi (2006).
The qualication in all these cases is that a rm able to issue a menu of o¤ers can
replicate the Pareto improving scheme and therefore devise a protable deviation. So it
can be argued that an equilibrium requires a reason the Pareto gain cannot be realized
by private action. This will be further discussed in Section 3.2.
All these papers involve an increase in the cost of partial cover relative to full cover.
A case for increasing the cost of insurance in general is a side result of de Meza and Webb
(2001). The assumptions are heterogeneous risk preferences, moral hazard, and claim
processing costs. More risk-tolerant types take fewer precautions and place less value on
insurance. An insurance tax discourages these bad risks from buying insurance (though
not from engaging in the risky activity), thereby improving the terms available to the good
risks. The de Meza and Webb conguration involves possible but special assumptions.
Bad risks dropping out of the risky activity, as analyzed here, seems a much more generic
phenomenon.1
The remainder of this paper unfolds as follows. A simple model in which it is possible to
1Avoidance is a form of precautionary or preventative activity, but it has special properties. Suppose
types di¤er in their cost of precautionary e¤ort. As in RS; the equilibrium correlation between risk and
cover will be positive. There is no element of advantageous selection and in its essentials the analysis of
an insurance tax is as in RS.
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choose whether to undertake the risky activity is specied in Section 2. The implications
of this optional participation model for the e¢ ciency of insurance taxation is examined
in Section 3. In particular, the marginal cost of public funds (MCPF ) raised through an
insurance tax, is calculated, along with the possibility of Pareto gain when the revenue is
redistributed in the form of a lump-sum subsidy. Comparison is made with the welfare
e¤ects of requiring mandatory full insurance cover for those engaged in the risky activity.
Numerical examples are also presented to show that welfare e¤ects may be large. Some
natural extensions to the model are sketched in Section 4. The empirical relevance of
asymmetric information to insurance has been challenged in recent years. Section 5 shows
that when risky activities are optional, existing tests are inadequate to reveal the presence
of asymmetric information. Finally, brief conclusions are drawn.
2 The Model
In most respects the model follows RS. Individuals di¤er in their competence in some
risky activity. H types have probability H of su¤ering an accident which causes them
nancial loss D; whilst for L types the loss probability is L with L < H . These
probabilities are private information. The proportion of the low to high risk types in the
population is n, which is publicly known.
Both types have the same concave utility function, U(M;R); whereM is consumption
of private goods and services and R 2 f0; 1g is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the
individual engages in the risky activity and 0 otherwise. We sometimes work with the
special case U(M; 1) = B+u(M), where B is the utility benet from participating in the
risky activity. All individuals have income endowment, M .2
An insurance contract involves premium, P; and net of premium payment, I; if the
nancial loss occurs. There are two or more risk-neutral insurance companies engaging
in Bertrand competition. The game is that the companies make simultaneous contract
o¤ers. Individuals then choose whether to engage in the risky activity and which policy
to buy.3
2.1 Equilibrium
For the same reason as in RS, there cannot be a pure-strategy pooling equilibrium.
Marginally lowering cover and reducing the premium will protably separate out types.
Three types of equilibrium are possible. When the risky activity provides little benet,
neither type participates in it. If the risky activity is su¢ ciently attractive both types
may participate, in which case there is a separating equilibrium in which the Hs are fully
insured and the Ls choose incomplete insurance, essentially the RS equilibrium. The
condition for Hs to be better o¤ participating is U(M; 0) < U(M   HD; 1): This also
guarentees that Ls participate as they are better o¤ than Hs in an RS equilibrium:
2This assumes the only nancial cost of the risky activity are those arising from an accident. This is
convenient but not crucial.
3In a dynamic setting, experience rating is a screening device that should in principle diminish the
e¤ect of hidden types.This mechanism will not be very e¤ective if clients have much higher discount rates
than companies.
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Figure 1: Separating Equilibrium
The equilibrium in which Ls participate and Hs do not is designated a partial par-
ticipation (PP ) equilibrium. Such an equilibrium requires U(M   HD; 1) < U(M; 0) <
U(M   LD; 1): That is, since it is always feasible to o¤er full actuarially fair insurance
to an H type engaging in the risky sector, the expected utility from taking such an o¤er
must be less than from not engaging in the risky activity. Moreover, the best that an
L can achieve from participation is full, fair insurance so this o¤er must dominate non
participation. Such an o¤er would also attract the Hs so it cannot be part of a PP
equilibrium. The o¤er taken by the Ls must involve partial cover so as not to attract Hs:
Figure 1 displays a PP equilibrium. Participation involves the possibility of an acci-
dent, the occurrence of which lowers income by D. Those engaging in the risky activity
therefore have income endowment EM with M1 good-state income and M2 bad. The
actuarially fair o¤er curve for the Ls is EML, of the Hs is EMH and the pooling o¤er
curve is EMP . Non participation with incomeM delivers the same utility as participation
with full insurance at premium CV which is therefore an index of the benet of the risky
activity. If driving is a perfect substitute for other spending, i.e. U(M; 1) = U(M + B);
CV = B. An equilibrium is shown in which L types participate and obtain partial insur-
ance at A, whilst H types are marginally better o¤ not participating than at A. This is
a least-cost separating equilibrium. Formally, it is the zero expected-prot contract that
maximizes the expected utility of the low risks subject to the high risks weakly better
o¤ rejecting the contract. Contract A is preferred by the Ls to any contract along the
pooling o¤er line, EMP . So there is no incentive to break the equilibrium with a pooling
o¤er.
At the end of Section 3.1 we examine an initial equilibrium in which B is su¢ ciently
high that both types participate in the initial equilibrium.
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Figure 2: Mitigated burden of insurance taxation
3 The mitigated burden of insurance taxation
The basic intuition of the e¢ ciency gain is illustrated in Figure 2. An initial PP equilib-
rium is at A, with the participation constraint of the Hs binding the Ls. Introduction of
a lump-sum insurance tax of t shifts down the zero-prot o¤er curve for the Ls.4 Specif-
ically, the purchase of a zero-cover policy results in a shift of consumption from EM to
EMt , but leaves the incremental cost of cover unchanged. The new o¤er curve is therefore
parallel to the old, resulting in a new equilibrium at B.5 To maintain the L0s insurance
cover with the tax, involves the o¤er at C. For Hs; the increased premium associated
with the o¤er is strictly inferior to non participatiom. As a result, cover can be increased
without drawing in the Hs. The new equilibrium is at B. If instead of the insurance tax,
the Ls faced an equal poll tax, to deter Hs the insurance policy must be unchanged. So
the Ls are positioned at C, which involves a lower indi¤erence curve than B. If a poll tax
were to have the same e¤ect on the welfare of Ls tax revenue would fall by proportion
CD=AC.
The analysis will now be elaborated and quantied.
3.1 The Marginal Cost of Public Funds via Insurance Taxation
The marginal cost of public funds, MCPF; is a measure of the e¢ ciency cost of raising
extra government revenue and therefore of the hurdle benet that incremental public
spending must exceed to be worthwhile.6 In the case of a tax, MCPFt is the summed
equivalent variations of all those a¤ected by an incremental change in its rate divided by
4The gure assumes it is the company that directly pays the tax. Proceeds are used to provide a
public good that enters the utility function additively.
5The indi¤erence curve of the Ls through B must pass above EM for insurance still to be taken.
6Dahlby (2008) provides a comprehensive account of the concept.
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the net change in the revenue raised. If there are deadweight costs (or administrative
expenses), the equivalent monetary losses to the payers exceed the revenue raised, so
MCPFt > 1:
7 In the case of an insurance tax, the payers enjoy a secondary benet
through an extension of cover, as illustrated in the previous section. It follows that for
an insurance tax, MCPFt < 1:
An explicit derivation follows which will also serve as the basis for numerical evaluation.
In a PP equilibrium it is only Ls that are a¤ected by the insurance tax, t. Writing the
expected marginal utility of type i as EU 0i (i = L;H);
MCPFt =   1
EU 0L
dEUL
dt
(1)
where
EU 0L = LU
0(M  D + I) + (1  L)U 0(M   P ) (2)
P =
1
1  L (LI + t) (3)
dP
dt
=
1
1  L

L
dI
dt
+ 1

(4)
dEUL
dt
=  (1  L)U 0(M   P )dP
dt
+ LU
0(M  D + I)dI
dt
(5)
=  U 0(M   P ) + [U 0(M  D + I)  U 0(M   P )]LdI
dt
(6)
A change in t a¤ects the entry incentive of Hs; so dI=dt is derived from the binding
participation constraint
HU(M  D + I) + (1  H)U(M   P ) +B = U(M) (7)
dI
dt
=
(1  H)U 0(M   P )
H(1  L)U 0(M  D + I)  L(1  H)U 0(M   P ) (8)
7Following Atkinson and Stern (1974), Dahlby (2008, p30) provides an apparent exception. Consider a
standard competitive market in which an excise tax is levied on a particular good. If the uncompensated
demand curve is vertical at all tax levels,MCPF = 1. This despite the substitution e¤ect being negative,
in which case elementary analysis shows that a nite commodity tax must involve a deadweight cost
increasing in the tax rate. The resolution of the puzzle involves considering the MCPF of a lump-sum
tax. A vertical demand curve implies the good is inferior, so a lump-sum tax raises demand for it. A
lump-sum tax therefore increases revenue from the excise tax. To raise government revenue by a dollar,
requires a lump-sum tax of less than a dollar. Thus the MCPF of a lump-sum tax is below 1. Were the
MCPF redened as the cost to the payers of an increase in a tax relative to the change in lump-sum
income needed to provide an extra dollar of government revenue, then for all positive values of the excise
tax, MCPF > 1:In our insurance context, the tax is xed per policy and so lump-sum taxation has no
secondary tax revenue implications. Even without redenition, MCPF < 1 does imply a deadweight
gain.
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Substituting the various terms into Expression 1
(9)
The rst inequality follows as setting H = L yields MCPFt = 0. For the second
inequality, note that the rst term is below unity because of risk aversion and partial
insurance coverage and the second term in square brackets is positive, making the whole
term less than one.
An important issue is whether an insurance tax is less costly the more similar the two
types. From Expression ??, dMCPFt=dH > 0 which follows as the numerator of the
nal curved bracket is increasing in H and the denominator is decreasing.
If the initial equilibrium is RS, it may seem that the MCPF of a xed tax per insur-
ance contract must be unity. This is not the case. The tax raises everyones gross premium
equally, in e¤ect an equal fall in safe income for all. Under the standard assumption of
decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA), the cost of risk is greater when income is lower
(Pratt (1964) Theorem 2). If the coverage of the two policies did not change, the partial
cover contract taken by the Ls that is just separating prior to the tax increment becomes
strictly less attractive to the Hs than full cover when both gross premiums rise equally.
Thus coverage is increased when all contracts are taxed, yielding Ls a secondary benet.
More explicitly, in the least-cost separating equilibrium, the incentive compatability
constraint is
HU(M  D + I   t) + (1  H)U(M   P   t) +B = U(M   HD   t) +B (10)
where P = L
1 L I is the net of tax premium on the contract taken by Ls, the net indemnity
is I and t is the insurance tax. From Equation 10,
dI
dt
=
HU
0(M  D + I   t) + (1  H)U 0(M   P   t)  U 0(M   HD   t)
HU 0(M  D + I   t)  (1  H)LU 0(M   P   t)=(1  L) > 0 (11)
The signing of Expression 11 follows from the proof in Mossin (1968, p.555) that under
DARA; the numerator is positive given that (7) holds.8 The e¤ect of t on expected utility
is,
dEUL
dt
=  (1 L)U 0(M P t) LU 0(M D+I t)+[U 0(M D+I t) U 0(M P t)]LdI
dt
(12)
8This is the key step in Mossins subtle proof that higher wealth decreases demand for insurance given
DARA:
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so
MCPFt =   1EU 0L
dEUL
dt
= 1  L[U 0(M D+I t) U 0(M P t)]
(1 L)U 0(M P t)+LU 0(M D+I t)
dI
dt
< 1
The mechanisms lowering MCPF when both types participate is di¤erent to that
when only Ls do. In the latter case, what matters is the substitution e¤ect of the tax in
raising participation costs and hence lowering the attraction of the L0s contract to Hs.
Given risk aversion, no other property of the utility function is required. In the former
case what matters is that insurance (against a given risk) is, under standard assumptions,
an inferior good. The tax thus lowers the attraction to Hs of the low cover contract taken
by the Ls: More restrictions on the utility function are therefore required. As inferiority
is the norm, where the initial equilibrium has both types participating, whether the tax
is low or high, in most cases MCPF < 1 but under increasing absolute risk aversion
(IARA); this will only be true when the tax is high enough that Hs are non participants.
Given DARA; it may seem that when the initial equilibrium has both types par-
ticipating, the insurance tax must always involve e¢ ciency gains. This is not the case
because there is a discontinuity in MCPF when the tax drives out the H 0s: As the Hs
are indi¤erent to participation, the derivative of their utility wrt tax is smooth at this
point. However, a tax increment leads to the Hs exiting and therefore a nite loss in tax
revenue. At this point, MCPF is innitely high. Driving out the Hs, relaxing the incen-
tive constraint on the Ls and allowing them to increase coverage is e¢ ciency enhancing,
but now there is also an e¢ ciency cost. In the original equilibrium some of the social
surplus generated by Hs is lost if they are driven out of the market. In essence, this is
the traditional deadweight cost of taxation. Except at the point Hs exit, MCPFt < 1;
nevertheless for taxes high enough to drive out Hs it is possible that the average cost of
public funds exceeds unity.9
Bringing together the results for the two types of equilibria;
Proposition 1 In an equilibrium in which only Ls participate, the marginal cost of pub-
lic funds raised through an insurance tax is positive but below unity. When both types
participate, the MCPF of a lump-sum insurance tax is below unity i¤ DARA holds.
3.2 Redistributive insurance taxation
In a PP equilibrium the proceeds of an insurance tax can be used to fund a payment of
s to those who do not participants in the risky activity.10 The subsidy payment lowers
the incentive of Hs to switch activities and therefore the extension of insurance cover to
the Ls that is made possible by the tax is greater than in the case where a (tax revenue
neutral) public good is provided. A given tax is less costly to Ls when the proceeds are
redistributed to Hs: The marginal equivalent monetary cost to Ls of transferring an extra
dollar to Hs by means of an insurance tax, denoted MCPF rt ; will now be computed.
9This is minus the equivalent variation associated with the introduction of a nite tax divided by
the revenue raised. Even if MCPF is continuous, the average cost of public funds (ACPF ) is notR
MCPF=(total tax revenue)
10Redistribution of this kind is most easily accomplished by using the tax proceeds to pay a poll subsidy,
s. If the insurance tax is set at T = t + s, the net amount paid by Ls is t and received by Hs is s:The
advantage of the poll subsidy is that there is no need to identify participants explicitly.
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With redistribution, the participation constraint is
HU(M  D + I) + (1  H)U(M   P ) +B = U(M + s) (13)
Dening the ratio of Ls to Hs in the population as n;for budget balance,
s = nt (14)
The e¤ect of a tax on the level of cover becomes
dI
dt
=
(1  H)U 0(M   P ) + (1  L)nU 0(M + s)
H(1  L)U 0(M  D + I)  L(1  H)U 0(M   P ) (15)
Evaluated at t = 0; so that P and I are the same whether or not revenue is redistrib-
uted, payment of the subsidy raises dI
dt
relative to the case of no subsidy by
dI
dt
=
(1  L)nU 0(M + s)
H(1  L)U 0(M  D + I)  L(1  H)U 0(M   P ) (16)
By discouraging entry of the Hs, the subsidy enables greater insurance coverage for
the same tax change. Dening the equivalent cost to Ls of e¤ecting a dollar transfer to
the Hs as MCPF rt ;
(17)
As in (9), the rst term is below unity and the second term is positive, soMCPF rt < 1.
Since the second term of (17) exceeds the second term of (9), at t = 0; MCPF rt < MCPFt.
Proposition 2 At t = 0, the marginal cost of raising public funds through an insurance
tax is lower if the proceeds are redistributed to non participants.
Expression 17 does not preclude MCPF rt < 0, which is to say that redistribution
benets the payers. As the Hs are better o¤ as a result of the subsidy, a Pareto gain is
implied. This is illustrated in Figure 3. The initial equilibrium is at A. For insurance
buying participants, the tax shifts the consumption endowment to EMt : The proceeds
are received by the non participating Hs so increasing their utility to UHt . The new
equilibrium is at At at which Ls are better o¤.
Formally, from Expression 17, MCPF rt can be rewritten as
(18)
Therefore, MCPF rt is negative if
U 0(M D+I)U 0(M P )(H L) < L(1 L)nU 0(M+s) [U 0(M  D + I)  U 0(M   P )]
(19)
So when the loss probability of the high risks and low risks (H   L) are similar and
the ratio of Ls to Hs, n; is su¢ ciently high, MCPF rt can be negative. Inequality 19 is
necessary for a Pareto improvement but it must also be checked that it is consistent with
the separating equilibrium not being broken by pooling and with the H types preferring
non-participation. A numerical example is provided in the next section.
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Figure 3: Pareto improvement
Proposition 3 A poll subsidy nanced by an insurance tax may yield a Pareto gain.
Given the existence of an initial equilibrium, the loss probabilities of the two types must
be su¢ ciently similar and the proportion of low risks high enough.
Generating a Pareto improvement is not just a matter of appropriate functional forms
and parameter values. If government intervention can make everyone better o¤, insurers
may be able to take advantage of similar strategies to raise their prots. If they can, the
equilibrium is broken. RS analyze the possibility of Pareto improving transfer payments
in their model, also discussing what prevents the gains being achieved through private
action.11 What is required is that insurers cannot issue multiple contracts, or that every
individual contract must at least breakeven.12 It is hard to nd a rationale for such
contractual limitations.
When it is possible to opt out of the risky activity, the restriction on private contracting
that allow Pareto improvable PP equilibria are di¤erent and more plausible. Transfers
from Ls to Hs are required to relax the incentive constraint on the Ls: For an insurer
to accomplish this they would have to pay people not to insure, a di¢ cult condition to
monitor. Preventing those accepting payment from purchasing from a rival might be hard
and the exclusionary contract could itself be illegal.
Even if it is impossible to pay people not to insure, the necessary and su¢ cient condi-
tions for a Pareto improvement are quite restrictive. Nevertheless, the case for redistrib-
11Bisin and Gottardi (2006) show that instead of a tax, the transfer can be e¤ected by a tradeable
consumption right. To sell the low-premium policy, insurers must buy permits issued to the whole
population. Dahlby (1981) and Wilson (1977) show that requiring everyone to buy a common, stand-
alone policy, which can be supplemented in the private market may be Pareto improving. As the common
policy is sold on the same terms to everyone, it involves the required transfer from Ls to Hs: This would
not work in the OO model as Hs would be ine¢ ciently attracted in to the activity.
12Wilson (1977) also identies the possibility of Pareto gains and the contractural restrictions required.
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utive taxation does not depend on it generating a Pareto improvement. No actual policy
ever does yield a Pareto gain. The issue is whether the policy raises social welfare. The
lower is the cost to Ls of raising the tax revenue to be transferred to the Hs (that is the
larger the e¢ ciency gain), the more redistribution is justied. As the MCPF rt < 1; if
the marginal utility of income is at least as high for Ls as Hs; redistributive insurance
taxation raises utilitarian social welfare.
Proposition 4 If the proceeds of an insurance tax are paid out as a poll subsidy to non
participants, a su¢ cient condition for aggregate utility to rise is that the marginal utility
of income is not lower for Ls than Hs:
Only if the expected marginal utility of the Ls is su¢ ciently above that of the Hs
in the initial equilibrium will redistributive taxation lower social welfare. This could be
the case if Ls are poor relative to Hs or if the risky activity is complementary to other
market goods.
Although in a PP equilibrium redistributing the proceeds from an insurance tax is
likely to raise welfare, it does not follow that this is the optimal redistributive policy.
Consider rst a pure RS equilibrium in which non participation is not an option. Max-
imising social welfare is straightforward in this setting. First note that if information
were somehow to become symmetric, there would be a strict Pareto improvement. The
full-cover contract taken by Hs is unchanged but Ls are now able to obtain full cover on
actuarially fair terms. This symmetric equilibrium has income certainty for both types,
but Ls are better o¤ than Hs. Therefore, a further gain is possible under any anonymous
quasiconcave social welfare function by equalizing income. This outcome is achieved un-
der asymmetric information by mandatory full cover. If it is then desired to raise tax
revenue this is done e¢ ciently by a premium tax or a poll tax with MCPF = 1.13
There are implications of this analysis for the PP equilibrium. Mandatory full insur-
ance for risky activity participants will tend to draw in the Hs: This is dysfunctional in
that Hs generate more social surplus by staying out. The benecial e¤ect is that Ls end
up with full cover, as under full information. If the Hs were only slightly better o¤ in
the initial equilibrium than in the RS equilibrium, entry has negligible cost and manda-
tory insurance has virtually the same e¤ect on utilities as in the RS case and therefore
increases aggregate welfare. The alternative policy is redistributing the proceeds of an
insurance tax to non participations. This avoids attracting Hs into the risky activity and
as MCPF rt < 1; may also be welfare improving, as demonstrated in the examples in the
next section. The drawback is that the Hs have higher disposable income through not
having to pay the insurance premium or su¤er losses. It is therefore ambiguous whether
mandatory insurance or an insurance tax achieves higher welfare when only Ls partici-
pate. Mandatory insurance is advantageous when the risky activity is relatively attractive
to Hs; the greater the accident risk of the Hs, and the lower the benet of extending
insurance for the Ls. The rst column of the Table in the next section is a case where
mandatory insurance and entry by Hs is best whilst the next four cases yield higher
aggregate welfare from the tax/subsidy policy.
13The poll tax avoids the possibility that the Ls prefer not to insure.
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Proposition 5 In an initial RS equilibrium, mandatory full insurance maximizes social
welfare and it may do so in a PP equilibrium.
3.3 Numerical Results
To give some indication of magnitudes, Table 1 computes MCPFt and MCPF rt (with
the associated coverage and premium levels) for a variety of parameters assuming the
utility function U = B + lnM and M = 100: All the cases except for Case 6 in the Table
involve equilibria in which, under laissez faire, only Ls participate in the risky activity.14
Outcomes are computed for t = 0 and for the tax that maximizes aggregate utility when
proceeds are redistributed, t = t.
Case 1 has MCPF rt < 0; at t = 0; so a small redistributive insurance tax yields a
Pareto improvement. This is facilitated because at t = 0; the Hs are hardly better o¤
by staying out, severely limiting how much insurance Ls can take. Extra insurance is
therefore valuable to the Ls. In addition, there are relatively few Hs, so the income
transfer to them has a large e¤ect on their utility, making entry much less attractive,
allowing a substantial extension of insurance for the Ls. A small tax therefore benets
the Ls as well as theHs. This does not imply that Ls are better o¤under the optimal tax.
Assuming a utilitarian social welfare function, the sum of individual utilities is maximised
at optimal tax of 2.65, comprising some 17% of the total premium. At the optimal tax,
Ls are worse o¤ than in the absence of intervention. This reects the e¢ ciency with
which transfers can be made. Nevertheless, at the optimal tax, MCPF rt < 1. Although
giving Hs an extra dollar costs Ls less than a dollar, what limits the transfer is that the
marginal utility of extra income to the Ls is higher than to the Hs.
Evaluated at t = 0; by Proposition 2, it is always true thatMCPFt > MCPF rt . When
t > 0 , this is not necessarily true. Although the e¤ect on coverage of a marginal change
in the tax rate is always greater when the proceeds are redistributed, the initial cover
is also higher. The Ls are thus better o¤ with redistribution, their expected marginal
utility of income, the denominator in marginal cost of public fund calculations is greater,
so starting from a nite tax it is possible that MCPFt < MCPF rt : Though this does not
(quite) occur in Cases 3, 4 and 5, it does in Cases 1 and 2. Nevertheless, Ls are always
better o¤ with redistribution because the enhancement of the utility of Hs allows the Ls
to obtain higher cover.
The alternative policy to an insurance tax is compulsory full insurance. As the initial
equilibrium is least cost separation, this policy induces entry by the Hs, which is inef-
cient in itself but achieves e¢ cient full cover for the Ls without adverse distributional
consequences. If the Hs are not much better o¤ in the initial equilibrium than were
they to enter and obtaining full cover then mandatory full insurance for risky activity
participants is best, as is Case 1 here.
Case 2 is the same as Case 1 except the relative number of Hs is increased. This
does not change the insurance contract necessary to achieve separation when t = 0.
The response of coverage to a non redistributed tax is therefore also unchanged and
so consequentially is the initial MCPFt. If though the revenue raised is redistributed,
14In all cases it is checked that least-cost separation is not broken by a pooling o¤er, that the Hs are
better o¤ not participating and that the tax does not stop the Ls insuring.
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it is now spread amongst more Hs, hence it does not increase the attraction of non
participation as much as in Case 1. As a result, cover increases less in response to taxation
and MCPF rt is not as low as in Case 2. With a given redistributive tax, insurance
coverage would be lower with more Hs. The value of extra insurance is thus increased
but raising the tax is less e¤ective in promoting insurance. The net e¤ect is that the
optimal redistributive tax is higher than before, but coverage is still lower. Mandatory
insurance again involves entry by Hs, the increased number of which means the e¢ ciency
cost of this e¤ect is higher than Case 1. The optimal tax now beats mandatory insurance
in terms of welfare.
Case 3 raises the loss probability of the Hs from that of Case 2. Other things equal,
entry is now less attractive to theHs. Equilibrium cover is therefore higher, depressing the
value to Ls of further expansions. Were the Hs to enter, insurance is now more valuable
to them, so higher premiums do not entail such large increases in cover to compensate
the Hs. Both MCPFt and MCPF rt are therefore higher at the initial equilibrium. The
optimum tax is lower, but the e¢ ciency cost of attracting the even worse performing Hs
through mandatory cover is greater than Case 2, so in terms of aggregate utility, it is
again inferior to the optimum tax.
Relative to Case 2, Cases 4 and 5 make participating in the risky activity less attractive
for both types. In Case 4, the nancial loss of an accident is increased and in Case 5 the
benets are lowered. The e¤ects on MCPFt and MCPF rt are similar to Case 3 where it
is only the Hs for whom the risky activity is made less attractive. In Case 4, where the
nancial loss is raised relative to Case 2, entry is less attractive for Hs allowing higher
initial coverage for the Ls: Although cover is now more responsive to tax, the value of the
extra cover is diminished and the net e¤ect is to raise the marginal cost of public funds.
In Case 6, the benet of participation is su¢ ciently great that the initial equilibrium
is RS: Consistently with Proposition 1, MCPFt < 1:
The general message of the Table is that optimal tax rates are high relative to the
equilibrium premium and the marginal cost of public funds is well below unity.
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Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4 Case 5 Case 6
Ratio of Ls to Hs 4 1 1 1 1 1
Utility from participation 0:3 0:3 0:3 0:3 0:25 0:4
Monetary loss of accident 70 70 70 90 70 70
Accident probability of Ls 0:2 0:2 0:2 0:2 0:2 0:2
Accident probability of Hs 0:4 0:4 0:5 0:4 0:4 0:4
At t = 0 :
- Premium 5:32 5:32 7:30 11:74 7:55 4:23
- Net payout 21:27 21:27 29:20 46:97 30:22 16:94
- dI=dt 1:27 1:27 0:95 1:60 1:62 0:13
- dIr=dt (Redistribution) 7:71 2:88 2:36 3:48 3:61 N=A
- MCPFt 0:67 0:67 0:80 0:74 0:75 0:98
- MCPF rt (Redistribution)  0:26 0:44 0:66 0:56 0:55 N=A
At Optimal RedistributiveTax
- Optimal tax t 2:65 4:93 3:21 2:67 3:02 N=A
- Premium 15:30 15:95 13:39 17:75 14:51 N=A
- Net payout 47:96 39:13 37:50 57:63 42:95 N=A
- dI=dt 1:47 1:69 1:08 1:91 1:96 N=A
- dIr=dt (Redistribution) 13:40 4:61 2:83 4:61 4:96 N=A
- MCPFt 0:72 0:76 0:84 0:81 0:82 N=A
- MCPF rt (Redistribution) 0:76 0:77 0:79 0:77 0:80 N=A
- Performance of Mandatory Insurance Better Worse Worse Worse Worse N=A
Table 1
4 Extensions
The benecial e¤ects of insurance taxation extend to multiple types, moral hazard, and
monopoly. After sketching these extensions the the case of underestimation of loss prob-
ability is examined.
With multiple participant types, the worst under insure to prevent entry by the best
non participants. To achieve separation, cover must be increasing in loss possibility. An
insurance tax, by making entry less attractive, allows the worst entrants to extend their
coverage, relsaxing the constraint on the next best types and so on. Benets trickle up,
creating e¢ ciency gains for each payer type.
Allowing those engaging in the risky activity to reduce the probability of loss by
undertaking costly e¤ort does not fundamentally change the analysis. In a two-type PP
equilibrium, the o¤er taken by L types will still be rendered unattractive to H types by
lowering cover from the full information level. An insurance tax provides an alternative
barrier to entry so lessens the need for ine¢ cient coverage reductions.
Turning to monopoly, suppose that the Ls prefer participation with no insurance to
non participation. Hs would not enter under actuarially fair insurance, so denitely prefer
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non participation to uninsured participation. Were full cover o¤ered at a premium equal
to the Ls willingness to pay, the Hs would be as well o¤ from this contract as are the
Ls so they would certainly take it. To exclude the Hs; which is potentially protable as
they are not willing to pay an actuarially fair premium, cover must be incomplete. An
insurance tax per contract is then absorbed by the monopolist with no e¤ect on coverage
or terms. It is neutral in terms of e¢ ciency. When the tax proceeds are redistributed to
the uninsured, the equilibrium contract may be a¤ected. The Hs nd participation less
attractive, so cover can increase, an e¢ ciency gain.
A nal extensioned is to biased risk assessment. As Adam Smith (1776) noted, "The
chance of gain is by every man more or less overvalued, and the chance of loss is by most
men undervalued and scarce by any man, who is in tolerable health and spirits, valued
more than it is worth.(Book 1, Chapter 10, p. 107). Amongst evidence he cited was
that in his time, many houses and ships were uninsured and risky occupations o¤ered
lower expected returns. Partly in response to empirical anomalies, interest in the role
of optimism in insurance markets has recently grown.15 The consequence here, perhaps
paradoxically, is to increase the benets of taxing insurance. An extension of coverage is
now more valuable than warranted by the self evaluation of the Ls.
To illustrate, suppose that insurers are realistic, but subjective loss probabilities of
Hs and Ls are below the true level. Suppose that under rational expectations, only Ls
enter. Optimism makes the risky activity more attractive, but let beliefs not be so biased
that Hs enter. The participation constraint of the Hs; expression 7 now in e¤ect has a
lower H which, as previously noted, raises dI=dt: Evaluating the e¤ects on the welfare
of Ls at true probabilities, the cost of public funds continues to be given by Expression
??, except with the lower subjective H :
Proposition 6 In a separating PP equilibrium with binding participation constraint op-
timism lowers the marginal cost of public funds.
When optimism is high, the Hs enter. A tax su¢ ciently high to discourage the entry
of Hs now benets them measured at true probabilities (their outcome is the same as
under rational expectations) as well as benetting the Ls through greater coverage.
4.1 Adequacy of the "positive correlation" test
This paper has made the classical assumption that insurance buyers have private infor-
mation concerning their risk. A number of empirical papers have recently challenged this
view. In particular, Chiappori and Salanie (2000) nd that comprehensively insured newly
qualied French motorists are no more accident prone than those with only third-party
coverage. They argue that were moral hazard or hidden types present, the insured would
display higher accident rates, controlling for characteristics observed by the insurance
15de Meza and Webb (2001) and Koufopoulos (2008) note that heterogeneous optimism, like heteroge-
neous risk preference, can lead to the insured having lower accident rates than the uninsured. Sandroni
and Squintani (2007) show that in the RS model with optimism Pareto improvements may not be pos-
sible. Spinnewijn (2010) and Coelho and de Meza (2012) report some evidence that the uninsured are
more optimistic than the insured.
15
company.16 This is the "positive correlation" test. As the correlation is not signicantly
di¤erent from zero, they conclude that drivers have no informational advantage over in-
surance companies.17 Applying a similar test to more seasoned Israeli drivers, Cohen
(2005) nds that choosing more insurance is associated with higher accident rates. The
reason for the di¤erence with beginning drivers may be that individuals learn about their
characteristics from experience, but as there was no information sharing in Israel, drivers
with poor records may be able to hide their tracks by switching companies. Cohen and
Siegelman (2010) survey the evidence on selection e¤ects more generally and nd that,
depending on the nature of the risk and the group covered, selection may be adverse,
advantageous or neutral.
The analysis of this paper suggests the positive correlation test omits a relevant el-
ement. If those who are uninsured because they choose not to participate in the risky
activity would have higher than average accident rates were they to participate, there is
a market failure. Consider, for example, elderly drivers. Those particularly at risk (or
their family) may be aware of their peril and most of those in this category may cease to
drive. Insurance companies are unlikely to have access to detailed information concerning
the deterioration in capacities. For those who continue as motorists, di¤erences in risk
may be less extreme. Within this group, choice of how much insurance to take may be
dominated by di¤erences in risk preferences, income and other factors that are unrelated
to risk exposure. Comparison of motorists with more and less insurance may show little
di¤erence in accident rates. To be specic, suppose the only private information concerns
a medical condition that impairs driving ability. Under full information, those with this
condition do not drive. As shown here, this remains true when type is hidden, but the
e¤ect is to limit the maximum cover available in the market. Asymmetric information
has impacted the insurance market and welfare improving intervention is possible. If risk
preferences di¤er between those without the condition, so will insurance choices. The
most risk averse of the good risks get less insurance than under full information and the
less risk averse take even less insurance.18 Amongst the insured, cover is not correlated
with loss probabilities.The standard test therefore falsely concludes that there is no policy
relevant asymmetric information.19
To see whether the participation decision involves appreciable selection e¤ects, it is
necessary to know what the loss rates of the non participants would be had they entered.
This may seem an intractable measurement problem, but exogenous premium changes
provide opportunities to do so. For example, the EU has recently prohibited gender-
based premiums. As a result, motoring premiums for women will tend to rise and for men
16The theory behind the "positive correlation" test is developed in Chiappori et al. (2006). There are
three important assumptions; i) competition ii) processing claims is costless iii) rational expectations.
See de Meza and Webb (2001), Koufopoulos (2009) and Jullien, Salanie, and Salanie (2007)
17Chiappori, Julien, Salanie and Salanie (2006) also test the positive correlation property on a dif-
ferent dataset of young French motorists. Incorporating administrative costs they now nd evidence of
asymmetric information.
18Heterogeneous risk preferences will only lead to coverage di¤erences if there are administrative costs
in processing claims.
19A similar issue arises if selection is by some observable choice. For example, some types of car may
attract bad drivers. Controlling for car driven, as does the "positive correlation" test, misses a route by
which hidden types manifests itself.
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to fall. So it can be investigated whether this a¤ects trends in the numbers of male and
female drivers and their relative claim rates.
5 Conclusions
The theme of this paper is that when losses can be attributed to participation in activities
that are risky but optional, an insurance tax yields e¢ ciency gains. By making the risky
activity less attractive, bad risks are discouraged from participating, enabling good risks
to take more insurance. This implies that revenue raised by means of a general insur-
ance tax involves a marginal cost of public funds that is below unity, an e¢ ciency gain.
Redistributive taxation is particularly e¤ective in extending cover, as it not only lowers
the absolute benets of participation but raises the gain from non participation. Indeed,
an insurance tax with the proceeds distributed as a poll subsidy may even benet the
insured. Moral hazard, multiple types and optimism do not eliminate these benets and
sometimes enhance them. Rather paradoxically, mandatory insurance for those engaging
in the risky activity is an alternative to insurance taxation as a means of raising welfare.
It is ambiguous which policy does best, but there are circumstances where both should
be used.
The test of the relevance of the analysis is whether the accident prone are less likely
to engage in risky activities, such as motoring, than are observationally identical partic-
ipants.20 This is an aspect of selection e¤ects that has not been investigated empirically
and is not captured by the standard "positive correlation" test.
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